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The  role of debt/credit  in a market  economy has  recently  received  an 
unusually disproportionate  amount of theoretical  and  empirical attention, as  well 
as coverage by  the popular press.'  'Ihe  rising incidence of debt on balance 
sheets due to the increasingly important role of debt-finance has led to rising 
debt-equity ratios as well as other debt ratios.  This empirical phenomenon is 
caught in the conundrum of economic theory. 
that the actors in the financial  markets will 
to the markets and the markets will make the 
However, in this 
by arbitragers, 
counter to fears 
market system the additional 
Modigliani-Miller  [1958] allows 
accurately convey this information 
proper value adjustments,for risk. 
\ 
risk that  debt induces  will be born 
so debt's affect is neutral.  This approach  is a theoretical 
implicit  in the  empirical situation. An alternative theoretical 
approach denies the  neutrality of  debt emphasizing  instead the connectionbetween 
the financial and production sectors.  This connection is a conduit through  which 
the disruptions  in the financial sector are  transmitted to 
sector [Fisher, 1933; Minsky, 19861. 
This study is a continuation of the empirical research 
the nonfinancial 
on the impacts of 
debt; it argues that debt-usage is not neutral and that the currency of its cost 
is  bankruptcy.  A financially fragile economy is feared  because of its potential 
harm.  In the public sector the large and lingering deficit is not a problem in 
and of itself.  It is only when future scenarios of budget item trade-offs or 
recession-fighting  fiscal  policy  options  are  conjured  up  that  the  problem 
emerges.  The same is true for the corporate debt.  As  long as  the debt  is 
incurred in an expanding economy, there is no economic problem.  It is only when 
a contraction ensues that the problem emerges.  The problem is encapsulated in 
bankruptcy and the costs that accompany it.  Some of these costs are private 
and can be born by the  managers and owners.  However, in a recession this burden .  ’ 
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grows and spreads beyond the private; the costs become socialized. 
While  previous  researchers have  indicated  the  extent  of  consumer  and 
producer indebtedness, this study uses discriminant analysis  to simulate the 
impact of a recession on  the manufacturing sector  so  that a measure  of our 
current financial vulnerability is produced.  In the first section background 
material on the current financial structure of the United States is reviewed. 
The second section-delineates the:social.costs.  of bankruptcy.  The construction 
and characteristics of  the discriminant function are  specified  in .the third 
section.  The fourth section details the simulation and its results. 
The Debt Environment 
Since the early 
rise.  While  calling 
1980s researchers have noted that debt-usage is on the 
attention  to  the  changing  balance  sheets  of  American 
manufacturers,  these economists held  that these higher  debt  levels and debt 
ratios were not unusually high when placed  in an historical  context.2  More 
recently the business press in concert with a new set of economists have noted 
the alarming changes  in the use of "junk bonds",  the higher  than heretofore 
expected default risk associated with them and increasing incidence of these 
financial  instruments  in  the  portfolios  of  individuals  and  financial 
institutions.3  The  growth of the "junk bond" market has  coincided with  the 
industrial  restructuring  imposed  by  LAOS  and  takeovers  and  financial 
deregulation.  This economic restructuring is associated by some economists with 
an increase in efficiency, while others view the changes as dangerous to long 
run growth and stability.4 
The more commonly noted problem which is also associated with the large 
public debt lies in the shorter term.  The advent of a recession would increase 
the likelihood of default on outstanding debt.  Such defaults would throw the 3 
borrowers into bankruptcy, thus causing a decline in the expected income of the 
lenders.  In the case of a strong recession, the incidence  of bankruptcies among 
borrowers would be even higher possibly inducing a wave of bankruptcies among 
the lenders.  Given the present  weakened  position of many financial institutions 
such a scenario is highly credible. 
In a recent article Bernanke and Campbell  [1988]  produced in meticulous 
detail an overview of the changing financial structure of the production sector 
between 1969 and 1986.  Using market valuations of the debt and assyts of the 
firm'  they found that debt-asset ratios were higher on average in the 1980s than 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s.  However, the average debt-asset ratios of 
the  mid to late 1970s surpassed the 1980s.  Even when these sample averages were 
disaggregated and distributed, the mid to late 1970s remained the era with the 
highest debt-asset values.  In contrast to the debt-equity values the ratio of 
interest expense to cash flow was more than 1.5 times greater in the 1980s than 
in any previous period in their study. 
After putting the current debt picture into an historical frame Bernanke 
and Campbell attempt to gauge the severity of the corporate financial position. 
They use Altman's Z-score'model  which is based on a discriminant function that 
was  constructed  in 1968.  The  results from using  this model  on each  sample 
between 1969 and 1986 were inconclusive.  As Bernanke and Campbell noted this 
type of analysis is time period dependent.  Given that it reflects the economic 
structure of the late 196Os, it is unreasonable to expect it to provide telling 
results when applied over a 17  year time span.  The method has been pushed beyond 
its capabilities.' 
Given  the  inconclusive outcome  of  the  Z-score  analysis,  Bernanke  and 
Campbell proceeded to simulate the effects of recessions on the 1986 corporate 4 
financial  structure.  The  impact  of  the  simulated  results  was  gauged  by  the 
changes  in the population's  distribution.  Their  simulation  was  run using  only 
3 variables,  debt-asset  ratios,  ratio  of interest  expense  to cash  flow  and  the 
ratio of  interest expense to current assets.  The values  of  the simulated 
recessionary changes in these variables were derived from their changes in the 
1973-1974 and 1981-1982 recessions,  These changes were  applied  to the 1986 
values of these variables and a meanand< distribution,  were generated.  In the 
1973-74 simulation the debt-asset ratios exhibited a dramatic rise that pushed 
. 
10% of the sample into insolvency, i.e., their debt-asset ratios were greater 
than one.  The changes in the other two ratios  were not as spectacular, but they 
were substantial. 
The effects of the 1981-1982 recession  on the 1986 sample were  noticeable, 
but minor.  This result may be due to their  having used 1980 as a base year when 
it, too, was a recession year.?  In contrast to the first simulation, the 1981- 
1982 simulated debt-asset ratios only exceeded unity  in the 99th percentile. 
The interest expense to cash flow ratios reflect a much heavier debt burden than 
the 1973-74 results did.  These ratios were either negative or exceeded 100 in 
the 90th percentile starting in the second year of the recession and in both 
years of the recession in the 99th.  The changes in the interest expense to 
current assets ratio were milder than in the 1973-74 simulation. 
In the summary they state that solvency,  as measured by debt-asset ratios, 
has been relatively stable in recent years, but there has been a deterioration 
in some measures of corporate liquidity.  This divergence between the behavior 
of their  solvency  and liquidity  ratios in the 1980s  arose from the stock market's 
stable behavior.  As  a contrast to the early 1980s in the 1973-74 period the 
market value of firms declined precipitously, sending market-valued debt-asset 5 
ratios up.  Bernanke and Campbell's message is as long as there is no downturn 
as strong as the 1973-74 recession and the stock market holds its value,  then 
the solvency of the system is not threatened. 
The problem with  this type of analysis is its assumption of efficient 
markets  .8 The stock market valuation of the firm is expected to reflect the real 
value of the firm, therefore  being reflective  of its income-earning  capabilities. 
The point in "time" that this valuation is supposed to capture is a perfectly 
competitive equilibrium, so that it is  not disturbed by disequilibrating forces. 
\ 
However,  market  valuation 'at any  point  in  time  rather  than  providing  an 
equilibriumvalue  of a firm's  expected income  is  affectedby  speculative frenzies 
that afflict the buying public, the  uncompetitive power of institutional actors, 
asymmetrical informational flows and tax laws, a less than perfect,equilibrium 
position. 
While market valuation may not reflect the true value of the firm, it is 
important to the firm since its shares are sold on both primary and secondary 
markets, and the value of the financial instruments that it holds  in its own 
portfolio is  determined in the  market.  The  value of these financial investments, 
while not necessarily forming the core of the firm's value, are important.  They 
are a portion of the current assets of the firm and they are converted to cash 
when operating expenses must be paid.  The form that these financial investments 
take will determine their susceptibility to market  fluctuations, hence  their 
susceptibility to value changes.  The liquidity of the firm can experience rapid 
alterations due to the stock market's fluctuations. 
The following analysis of the U.S. corporate financial structure and its 
vulnerability  builds  on  the groundwork  laid  down  by  Bernanke  and  Campbell. 
Instead of depending upon an obsolete discriminant function, a function that is 6 
reflective of the current economic structure is created.  The variables  that 
emerge from the discriminant analysis as important  are then used to simulate the 
economic  impact of  a  recession  on  the current  financial  structure.  These 
alterations in approach produce results that are far less reassuring about the 
current corporate financial position than the Bernanke and Campbell findings. 
The Costs of Bankruptcy 
In general, economic  theory neglects the concept  of bankruptcy.  When 
approached it is usually  from an oblique angle which views  it as a positive 
result because it means that the competitive  market is working in a manner that 
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will  eradicate  inefficient producers.  Those who  go bankrupt  do  sb$  for  the 
economic good.  The  costs in such a case are negative which means a positive 
economic outcome.  Those who approach  bankruptcy from the opposite oblique angle 
do so through its repercussion: unemployment.  These costs are positive for they 
lead to increased demands upon the social safety net:  unemployment insurance, 
health and family  care  plans, and  welfare and  job training  programs.  In addition 
to the unemployment cost of bankruptcy is the decline 
in aggregate supply. 
in aggregate demand and 
A decrease in aggregate demand due to a decrease in wealth  [Hudson, 19891 
and/or  income which arises  from the increase in unemployment  in a Keynesian 
framework leads to production declines.  These demand and output reductions are 
supposed to  be stabilized  via price effects.  However, Caskey and Fazzari [1988] 
indicate  that  this  traditional  assumption  fails  to  hold  in  certain  cases. 
Instead  of inducing  stability,  price flexibility  maybe  responsible for  producing 
greater variation  in output.  So,  a  decrease  in aggregate  demand  leads  to 
production reductions and to price effects that  may exacerbate these reductions. 
In  Hudson  [1989]  while  acknowledging  the  demand  side  effects  from 7 
bankruptcy his major  focus is on the supply-side.  Bankruptcy's supply-side 
effects  impact not just  the utilization rate  of  capital, but  its continued 
existence.  Given the thin market for used capital equipment, once a firm goes 
bankrupt, the equipment may be physically destroyed  (scrap value) rather than 
resold.  While the real estate market for used buildings is deeper and broader 
than that for used capital  equipment,  even the  plant may be destroyed rather than 
resold.  This  plant  and equipment destruction  implies  that  the  supply-side 
effects  of  bankruptcy  lead  to  declines  in  productivity  and  the  ,increased 
probability  that when  demand  turns up,  there will  be  a  lag  in  the  supply 
response.g 
In addition to capital destruction,  Hudson follows in the tradition of the 
financial approach to recession, debt deflation, when he promotes the idea of 
a bankruptcy multiplier.  The death of a firm promotes the death of other firms 
via its credit linkages.  A creditor is only as healthy as its borrowers; the 
default of a borrower reduces the net worth of a lender.  In a recession when 
even  well-managed firms 
bankruptcy of lenders. 
are failing,  the accumulation of defaults may induce the 
Such failures do not denote a move towards efficiency: 
the  economy  blindly  working  its  way  back  towards  equilibrium.  They  are 
indicative of the excessive costs that accompany the bankruptcies arising from 
economic disruption. 
The Data and Discriminant Function 
The  data  set used  in  this study was  drawn  from  Standard  and  Poor's 
Compustat.  The construction of the discriminant function required a matched- 
pair sample, so  the data were culled for bankrupt  firms in the manufacturing 
sector that had complete information between  1985 and 1987.l'  There were  52 
bankrupt firms that met these requirements.  Each solvent firm was chosen so as to  match a bankrupt firm.  Matching proceeded according to asset size, last year 
of operation and SIC code.  The 
firms with asset values ranging 
between 2000 and 3999. 
resulting matched-pair sample consisted of 104 
from $0,8M to $29.865B and four-digit SIC codes 
Previous discriminant analyses of bankruptcy have utilized  ratios  that 
capture the liquidity, profitability, solvency, leverage and activity of the 
firm.ll  In these analyses short term.:  debt  financial ratios,  other  than  the 
current ratio,  have not been found to be of any merit in discriminatwg  bankrupt 
from solvent firms in the existent economies.  While short 'term  debt was not 
instrumental in these studies, some debt ratio was always significant.  Altman 
[1968] used  the market value of equity to book value of debt ratio; Altman, 
Haldeman,  and Narayanan  [1977] used  the interest-coverage ratio;  and Deakin 
[1972] used  the cash  flow  to  debt  ratio.  The  determinations  of  the best 
variables for each of these models were based on univariate F-statistics and a 
search process that would evaluate each variable's individual contribution to 
the discrimination process.  These determinations are historically dependent; 
the  particular  variables that  produce  the  best discriminant  function change along 
with the structure of the economy. 
The  variable  selection  processes  utilized  in  this  study  included  a 
conditional deletion method which tests each variable for its ability to reduce 
the F-statistic associated with Wilk's  lambda  [Altman, Avery,  Eisenbeis and 
Sinkey, 19811, the univariate F-statistic, and a search  process that ranked each 
variable's contribution to the discrimination process.  Thus, both multivariate 
and univariate tests aided in variable selection.  Table  1 shows the 8 best 
variables,  their univariate  F's  and  the reduction of  the  Wilk's  lambda  F- 
statistic.  In Table 1 the first row of numbers for each variable refers to the 9 
TABLE  1 
Discrimiaant  Function  Variables 
UNIVARIATE  F  CHANGE  IN  WILXS' 













4.64  2.61  's 
5.95  1.37  s 
17.55  0.60 
19.95  2.38 
4.19  3.16 
6.48  1.03 
13.04  0.43 
12.83  0.17 
20.92  3.13 
18.52  5.64 
12.25  0.35 
20.19  1.54 
2.36  4.85 
0.01  0.00 discriminant function generated for the hold-out method and in the second row, 
the  italicized numbers refer  to the discriminant function generated  for the 
simulations.  While the change in the Wilks' Lambda F-statistic does not always 
appear  as  a  large number,  the Wilks'  Lamdba  F-statistic for  each  of  these 
variables was significant at the 0.001 level. 
These financial  ratios are a combination of those that have been found to 
be significant for discriminating  between,dailedand nonfailed firms in previous 
studies and those that have never been significant in previous studies.  The 
. 
ratios that fall  into  the  former  category include  interest-times  earnings\  (FCBT), 
quick ratio (QUIK),  current ratio (CUR),  working capital to total assets (WCAT), 
current liabilities to total assets (LCTAT) and net profit margin  (NPM).  The 
other ratios, short term debt to total assets (DLCAT) and short term debt to 
total  debt  (DLCDT), are  in  the  latter category.  All  of  these  ratios  are 
interesting  because they are all indicators of a short  period view of the firm's 
liquidity, profitability and debt position.  DLCAT and  DLCDT  are  even more 
interesting because instead of a total debt to assets or equity ratio being the 
significant variable, indicators of the firm's short term debt position take on 
a pivotal role.  As the scores in Table 1 indicate,  both of these variables were 
found to be strongly significant in both the univariate and multivariate tests. 
The immediate implication of this roster of ratios is obvious, there has been 
a  dramatic change  in the financial structure of the U.S.  corporation.  The 
previous section pointed in this direction and the importance of these ratios 
to the discriminant function supports those descriptive statistics. 
In  order  to  test  the  robustness  of  these  variables,  two  different 
discriminant methods were used.  First, the hold-out method was used.  This 
method requires that  the  sample  be subdivided  into  two  subsamples each with equal 11 
TABLE 2 
A.  HOLD-OUT METHOD 
1.  SELF TEST 
Bankrupt  Solvent  N 
Bankrupt  16  10  26 
Solvent  0  26  26 
__  _ - _ - _ _ - - - - _ _ - - - - - - - 
16  36  52 
2.  HOLD-OUT TEST 
Bankrupt  Solvent  N 
Bankrupt  17  9  26 
Solvent  7  19  26 
- - * _ - _ _ - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - 
24  28  52 
B.  U-METHOD 
Bankrupt  Solvent  N 
Bankrupt  30  22  52 
Solvent  13  39  52 
_ _ - - - - - - - _ _ - - - _ - - - - - - 
43  61  104 12 
numbers of  solvent and  failed  firms.  he  subsample is used  to estimate  L 
discriminant function which is then used on the other subsample to classify it 
and determine the sample proportions of misclassified  observations.  The second 
method,  the U-method,  is  an  iterative process based  upon  holding  out  one 
observation at a time, estimating a discriminant function with  the remaining 
observations and then classifying the held-out observation [Lachenbruch,  19671. 
While  this method has  a  strong advantage in its insensitivity to normality 
assumptions, its execution for very large samples is problematic as yell as it 
does not produce a  single discriminant function [Altman, Avery, Eisenbeis and 
Sinkey, 19811.  Each iteration produces a new discriminant function, for the 
included  observations are always different  by one.  Since there is  not just one, 
but  n  discriminant functions  produced  in  this method,  using  it  to predict 
bankruptcy  in  other  samples,  such  as  in  our  simulations,  is  impossible. 
Therefore, the two methods simply act to check the robustness of these financial 
ratios  in  separating  the  solvent  from  the  failed.  The  Appendix  details 
distributional characteristics of the samples in the study and the properties 
of the two discriminant techniques. 
Table 2  reproduces  the  classification  results  from  each of these  estimating 
techniques.  The prior probabilities adopted in each case were 1% probability 
of bankruptcy and 99% probability of solvency.  These prior probabilities were 
derived  from  the  average  bankruptcy  rate  in  the  U.S..l'  Using  prior 
probabilities compensates for the assumed probabilities of 50% that would be 
estimated from the population proportions in the matched-pair sample.  Since 
there is not a 50-50 chance that a firm will go bankrupt, especially if it is 
either large or  has been  in existence longer than 1 year,  the effect of  the 
priors on the classification of observations is of consequence. 13 
The results of the hold-out method indicate that when  the discriminant 
function is used to classify an independent sample, it will correctly classify 
65% (17/26)  of the  bankrupt firms and 73% (19/26)  of the solvent firms.  Overall, 
the classification scheme is correct in 69% (36/52) of the cases.  Given that 
the proportional chance  criterion  is 50%  [Morrison, 19691,  the discriminant 
function is out-performing chance by almost 40%.13 
The  U-method  produces  classification results  similar  to  the  hold-out 
method's.  It correctly classified bankrupt firms 58% (30/52) of thq time and 
nonfailed  firms 75%  (39/52) of the time.  Overall,  the classifications were 
correct  in  66%  (69/104)  of  the  cases.  Again,  with  a  proportional  chance 
criterion of 50% this indicates that the discriminant 
chance by 32%. 
function is out-performing 
The similarity in classification results that was obtained from the two 
different  discriminant  techniques  indicates  the  robustness  of  the  these 
particular variables in separating failed from solvent firms.  While they are 
robust,  the  overall  correct  classification  rate  and  individual  category 
classification rates are not as high as that found in other studies  [Altman, 
1968; Beaver, 1966; and Blum, 19741.  The probable reason for this lies in the 
Compustat data set.  Most  of  the bankrupt firms were  taken from Compustat's 
research file.  The deletion date  which is their indicator  of date of liquidation 
or bankruptcy is on average 27 months after the last income statement or balance 
sheet has been received from the firm [Standard  and Poor's, 1988:190].  This lag 
indicates that the  most recent data on the firm is on average over two years old. 
The stronger results of the other studies were based on data which had at most 
a one year lag.  The percentage of correct  classifications in these  other studies 
was comparable to this study's results when the discriminant function was based 14 
, 
TABLE 3 
1988 SAMPLE: MEANS AND DECILE DISTRIBUTION 
MEAN  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
ICBT 
5.49  -103.22  -2.04  0.82  1.93  2.98  4.28  5.99  8.68  14.73 114.70 




0.11  0.00  0.01  0.02  0.03  0.04  0.06  0.09  0.14  0.21  0.64 
DLCDT 
0.32  0.00  0.04  0 OS  0.13  0.19  0.26  0.37  0.52  0.74  0.97 
NPM 
-25.81  -310.30  -8.26  -0.62  1.56  2.84  4.01  5.19  6.55  8.65  65.34 
DT/MKEQ 
0.99  0.01  0.07  0.14  0.22  0.30  0.41  0.56  0.81  1.34  7.01 15 
TABLE 4 
RESULTS FROM DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS ON 1988 SAMPLE 
BANKRUPT 
BANKRUPT  SOLVEXT  N 
10  12  22 
SOLVENT  363  1226  1589 
-  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  ____ 
373  1236  1611 on data 2 to 3 years 
The Simulations 
In a recession 
bankruptcy  of  firms 
16 
prior to bankruptcy. 
it is the reduction in production and investment and the 
that produces  the short  term  social  ills  of  decreased 
aggregate demand and income,  deflation  and  unemployment.  By using a discriminant 
function to simulate  the  effects of a recession,  a partial  indication of  a 
recesion's potential impact is hypothesized via the change in the 
bankruptcy.  In this simulation there is no attempt to imply that 
structure in 1974-75 or in 1980-1982 is exactly like that in 1988. 
has changed since 





1982 and certainly since 1975.  The point of the simulation 
indicator  of  a  recession's  impact  on  the  current  highly 
The  structure  of  the  1988  manufacturing  sector  of  the  economy  was 
represented by a sample of 1611 firms drawn from Compustat.  The selection of 
these firms was based on having a SIC code between 2000 and 3999 and complete 
information for the 8 variables.  Of these firms, 1589 were solvent and 22 were 
bankrupt,  but  still  in  operation.14  This  produces  an  inherent  structural 
proportionality of 0.01 and 0.99 in the sample that is to be classified.  The 
financial structure of the 1988 sample is  presented in Table 3.  The mean values 
of five of the discriminant functions variables and the decile distribution of 
these variables  describe  the 1988 financial position.15  Given  the  economic 
significance that is ascribed to the debt-equity ratio, it, too, is included in 
the  structural  description,  even  though  it  was  not  significant  in  the 
discriminant analysis.  The weight of the large valued ratios in the sample 
drives up the values of the means, so that they fall into deciles greater than 
the 5th. Prior to running 
used on the 1988 sample 
17 
the  recession simulations, the  discriminant function was 
to  determine its  ability to separate  bankrupt and solvent 
firms in this initial sample.  The technique used was a variation on the hold- 
out method.  The discriminant function was constructed from the entire matched- 
pair sample consisting  of 104 firms, 52 solvent and 52 failed.  This discriminant 
function was then used to classify the 1988 sample of 1611 firms.  Table 4 shows 
the classification scheme produced by  the discriminant analysis.  Of  the 22 
bankrupt firms, 10 were correctly identified; and of the 1589 nonfailed firms, 
\ 
1226  were  correctly  classified. a  This  produced  a  45%  and  77%" correct 
classification rate for the bankrupt and solvent firms, respectively, and a 77% 
overall correct classification rate. 
In  the  individual  categories  it  is  apparent that  the  correct classification 
rate was lower for the  bankrupt firms,  but this finding  must be put in the  proper 
context.  The chance classification of a bankrupt firm is 1% in this sample, so 
the discriminant function's ability to classify these firms correctly in 45% of 
the cases attests to its discriminating prowess.  The discriminant  functions 
ability to correctly classify the solvent firms,  however, is less than dramatic. 
A chance solvent classification  based on population proportionality would be 99% 
in  this  sample.  However,  the  correct  classification  rate  was  only  77%." 
Obviously, the power of the model lies in its ability to detect bankrupt firms. 
Using recession-modifiedvalues  of the 1988 corporate financial structure, 
the simulation consisted of classifying these firms into bankrupt and solvent 
categories.  The average annual changes of the variables for each firm in the 
1974-75 and 1980-82 recessions were determined; the base years were  1973 and 
1979, respectively.  The firms' variables in the 1988 sample were modified by 
these annual average recession changes, and then the discriminant function was 18  i 
I 
TABLE 5 
SIMULATIONS OF 1980-82 AND 1973-74 RECESSIONS 
ON THE 1988 SAMPLE 
A.  1973-74 RECESSION SIMULATION RESULTS 
Year 1:  Classified as  Bankrupt Solvent N 
968  643  1611 
, 
Year 2:  Classified as  Bankrupt Solvent N 
1081  530  1611 
B.  1980-82 RECESSION SIMULATION RESULTS 
Year 1:  Classified as  Bankrupt Solvent N 
713  a98  1611 
Year 2:  Classified as  Bankrupt Solvent N 
1002  609  1611 
Year 3:  Classified as  Bankrupt Solvent N 
1165  446  1611 19 
TABLg  6 
Decile  Distribution 
Base  Year  :  1988 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
ICBT  -103.22  -2.04  .82  1.93  2.98  4.28  5.99  8.68  14.73  114.70 
CUR  0.68  1.21  1.48  1.69  1.92  2.18  2.48  2.94  3.74  8.74 
DLCAT  0.00  0.01  0.02  0.03  0.04  0.06  0.09  0.14  0.21  0.64 
DLCDT  0.00  0.04  0.08  0.13  0.19  0.26  0.37  0.52  0.74  0.97 
NPM  -310.30  -8.26  -0.62.  1.56.  2.84  4.01  5.19  6.55  8.65  65.34 
DT/  0.01  0.07  0.14  0.22  0.30  0.41  0.56  0.81  'L.34  7.01 
=EQ, 
1973  - 1974  Recession  Simulation 
Year  1:  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
ICBT  -85.46  -1.69  .68  1.60  2.46  3.54  4.96  7.19  12.20  94.97 
CUR  .69  1.23  1.50  1.72  1.95  2.21  2.52  2.98  3.79  8.24 
DLCAT  0.00  0.03  0.07  0.11  0.17  0.26  0.38  0.59  0.91  2.72 
DLCDT  0.01  0.09  0.14  0.31  0.46  0.64  0.90  1.27  1.79  2.36 
NPM  -161.97  -4.31  -0.33  0.81  1.48  2.09  2.71  3.42  4.52  34.11 
DT/  0.04  0.18  0.36,  0.56  0.78  1.04  1.42  2.06  3.41  17.8 
MXTEQ 
Year  2:  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
ICBT  -82.39  -1.63  .65  1.54  2.38  3.41  4.78  6.93  11.76  91.55 
CUR  .79  1.41  1.72  1.96  2.23  2.53  2.88  3.41  4.33  9.42 
DLCAT  0.00  0.04  0.10  0.16  0.25  0.38  0.57  0.87  1.35  4.01 
DLCDT  0.01  0.12  0.26  0.42  0.61  0.87  1.22  1.71  2.42  3.19 
NPM  -88.11  -2.34  -0.18  .44  .81  1.14  1.47  1.86  2.46  18.55 
DT/  0.03  0.15  0.29  0.45  0.62  0.83  1.14  1.65  2.73  14.30 
MKTEQ 20 
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TABLE 6 (cont'd) 
1980  - 1982  Recession  Simulation 
Year  1:  0 
ICBT  1_145.74 











Year  2:  0 
ICBT  -263.93 
.80 
DLCAT  0.00 
.  DLCDT  0.01 
NPM  -147.98 
DT/  0.02 
MXTEQ 
Year  3:  0 
ICBT  -268.42 
0.85 
DLCAT  0.01 
DLCDT  0.02 
NPM  -143.54 
DT/  0.03 
MKTEQ 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
-2.89  1.15  2.73  4.20  6.04  8.46  12.26  20.80  161.96 
1.33  1.62  1.85  2.10  2.38  2.71  3.21  4.08  8.88 
0.01  0.04  0.06  0.09  0.14  0.21  0.33  0.50  1.51 
0.06  0.12.  0.20  0.30‘  0.42  0.59  0.83  1.17  1.55 
-6.00  -0.45  1.13  2.06  2.92  3.77  4.76  '>  6.29  47.50 
0.08  0.15  0.23  0.32  0.42  0.58  0.84  1.40  7.33 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 5 
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run on this modified sample for each year of the "recession".  The result was 
the expected number of bankruptcies in each year of the simulated recession. 
In addition a new decile distributionbased  on  these modified values was produced 
for each "recession" year. 
The simulation results are shown in Table 5 and the new distributions in 
Table 6.  In the first year of a recession as strong as that experienced in 1973 
there were 968 firms classified as bankrupt and 643 as solvent.  This is more 
than 2.5 times the number classified as bankrupt  in the initial sample and a 
little more than one half of those categorized as  solvent.  In this first year 
of the recession 60% of the firms were classified as bankrupt compared to the 
base year's 23%.  However, not all of the firms classified as bankrupt or solvent 
were.  Given the  knowledge of the initial 1988  discriminant analysis, adjustments 
were made to the  recession  predictionwhich  produced a  more accurate illustration 
of a recession's impact. 
The adjustment factors are based on the categorical misclassifications as 
well as the in-category  correct  classification rates.  In the 1988  classification 
the discriminant function separated 373 firms into the bankrupt category; only 
10 of these firms  were actually  bankrupt.  This  is  a 2.7% correct classification. 
In actuality 22 firms were bankrupt, so the in-category correct classification 
rate was 45%.  Using these classification rates as adjustment factors produced 
the following picture of a recessionary impact.  With 968 firms categorized as 
bankrupt, given the  previous correct  classification probabilities, 58 of the 1611 
firms in the sample would actually be bankrupt by the end of the first year of 
the recession leaving 1553 as solvent.  The impact after 
recession as  strong  as  that in 1973 would  be  more  than 
bankruptcy. 
the first year of a 
a  250%  increase  in 22 
The  second year  of  the  1973-74  recession simulation  shows  1081  firms 
classified  as  bankrupt  and  530  as  solvent.  This  level  of  bankruptcy 
classification is almost 3 times that in 1988 and so is the number of actual 
bankruptcies.  Using the same adjustment factors there are 64 bankruptcies and 
1547 remain solvent.  The bankruptcy rate in the sample population has increased 
from 1.4% in 1988, to 3.6% in recession year 1, and to 4.0% in recession year 
2.  These are dramatic increases, yet they are conservative.  These failures are 
simply individual firm classifications, they fail to reflect the backward and 
forward linkages in a an economy that induce a  multiplier effect which spreads 
bankruptcy from firm to firm and industry to industry. 
Table  6 presents  the  complement  to  the  1973-74  recession  simulation, 
changes in the decile distributions of some salient financial ratios.  The most 
outstanding among these is the increases in  the debt ratios.  The DLCAT and DLCDT 
ratios never surpassed unity in 1988, however after recession year 1 DLCAT is 
greater than 1 in the 9th decile and after recession year 2 in the 8th decile. 
DLCDT is greater than unity in the 7th decile after year 1 and in the 6th decile 
in year 2.  The change in the debt-equity ratio is even more striking.  In 1988 
it surpassed unity  in the 8th decile, after year 1 in the recession the 5th 
decile was greater than unity.  In year 2 of the recession there was a slight 
reversal, and the debt-equity ratio surpassed unity in the 6th decile.  It is 
obvious from these ratios that the  major 
the  increase  in  short  term  usage. 
vulnerability  of  a  highly  leveraged 
recession. 
surge in the debt-equity ratio came from 
These  increases  indicate  the  extreme 
corporate  debt  structure  to  a  major 
Bernanke and Campbell concluded from their simulations that the effects 
from the 1973-74 recession produced the strongest impacts and a recession like 23 
that of 1981-82 was not truly worrisome.  As the results in Table 5 indicate, 
their conclusion  is only valid when  1980  is used  as  the base  year  for  the 
simulation.  Using  1980 as the first year of a three year recession effects 
different  results.  By  the end  of  the  third year  of  such  a  recession  the 
indications are that the economy would 
would surpass the impact of 1973-74. 
This  result  coincides with  the 
suffer a very large disruption, one that 
macroeconomic measures  of  recessionary 
impact, unemployment rates and rates of GNP growth in each of the two periods. 
\ 
The civilian unemployment rates for the 1979-82  period were 5.8%, 7.1%,'7.6%  and 
9.7%, respectively.  This compares to the 1973-75 period's 4.9%, 5.6% and 8.5% 
unemployment rates.  The real rates of growth of GNP for the two periods are 
equally as skewed.  The 1979-80 period experienced real growth rates of 2.5%, 
-0.2%, 1.9%, and -2.5%. respectively.  While the 1973-75 period's were 5.2%, 
-0.5% and -1.5%, respectively. 
After year 1 in the 1980-82 simulation, there were 713 firms categorized 
as bankrupt, 42 of these would have probably been bankrupt.  This number almost 
doubles the 1988 level.  In the second year there were 1002 firms classified as 
bankrupt.  Of  these  60  were  probably  bankrupt.  Compared  to  the  1973-74 
simulation in its second year this recession produces a weaker impact.  In the 
third year of the recession the economy is still experiencing a strong downturn 
which causes the number classified as bankrupt to rise to 1165, fully 72% of the 
sample, and the number of probably bankrupt to rise to 69.  The progression of 
the  bankruptcy rate for this recession simulation, 2.6% the first year, 3.7% the 
second year and 4.3% the final  year, shows the recessionary impact to  have taken 
longer, but in the final instance it has a more damaging impact on the economy. 
By the final year the bankruptcy rate has more than tripled. The decile distribution of variables 
temporal  pattern of development for most of 
variables have  steadily increasing values 
recession.  Comparing  the  5th  decile  in 
as seen in Table 
the  variables. 
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6 reflect this same 
The DLCAT and DLCDT 
over 
each 
simulation in  year 2 to have values comparable to 
2.  By year 3 these values exceed the peaks of 
the 3 years  of  the simulated 
simulation  shows  the  1980-82 
the 1973-74 simulation in  year 
the 1973-74 simulation.  This 
heavy use of short term debt is conveyed by the rise in DLCDT's 5th decile and 
in  DLCAT's 7th decile to a  value greater than  unity.  The rationale 
usage is seen in the changing value of NPM.  The net profit margin 
4.01 in the 5th decile in 1988 to 2.92 in recession year 1, 1.91 
1.86 in year 3.  This NPM value in year 3 is not as low as that 
year of the 1973-74 simulation, but the decline from the base year 
damaging. 
for this debt  \ 
declihes‘  from 
in year 2 and 
in the second 
is still very 
The "recession's" impact on the debt-to-market value equity ratio, while 
heavy, did not have as strong of an impact as the 1973-74 recession.17  In the 
first year of the 1973-74 simulation the debt-equity ratio in the 5th decile was 
pushed to a value greater than unity.  In year 1 of the 1980-82 simulation that 
value was 0.42.  This is not much of change from the base year value of 0.41. 
The succeeding years indicate relatively large increases in total debt usage. 
While year 1 has the debt-equity value exceeding unity in the 8th decile just 
as it does in the  base year, it  jumped forward one decile in each additional year 
of the simulation.  Therefore,  in the final year of the simulation the debt- 
equity ratio exceeded unity in the 6th decile.  Irrespective of which simulation 
has the debt-equity ratio that surpasses unity in the lowest decile, the fact 
remains that the economic  impact of almost 40% of the economy's  firms being 
categorized de facto as insolvent would be devastating. 25 
The  recessionary  behavior  of  ICBT  and  CUR  ran  counter  to  the  other 
variables.  As  in  the  1973-74  simulation, CUR increased in value.  The expected 
behavior,  however,  would  be  a  decrease  in  its value  reflecting  the  firm's 
deteriorating financial position.  Traditional wisdom  in a recession dictates 
that inventories will rise and debt will decline.  Such behavior would cause the 
current ratio to decrease in  value.  As has been apparent from this study, debt, 
especially short term debt, has risen and one of the "modern" techniques firms' 
have employed to shield them against the deleterious impacts of recessions is 
\ 
inventory control.  With both of these variables moving in directions 'opposite 
to what is expected the result would be a rising current ratio. 
Of the two ratios the  unexpectedbehavior  of ICBT in the 1980-82  simulation 
is the  more curious.  The key to such  behavior might be found in the r8latiOnShip 
between inflation and the interest rate on short term debt.  The average 6 month 
commercial paper  (CP) rate  in 1979 was  10.91%,  inflation as measured by  the 
change in the industrial Producer's Price Index was 13%  [CEA, 19881.  In the 
recession years both prices and interest rates rose, but prices rose faster than 
interest rates: in 1980 the change in the PPI was 16% and the CP interest rate 
was 12.29%; in 1981 the change in the PPI was 11% and the CP interest rate was 
14.76%; and in 1982 the change in the PPI was 3% while the CP interest rate had 
dropped to 8.5% by the end of 1982.  Inflationary increases, in general, were 
outstripping interest rate increases.  As long as the price increases were not 
overwhelmed  by declines in sales,  before tax income plus interest  payments would 
grow faster than interest payments. 
In Conclusion 
The discriminant analysis simulations  and the  distributional analysis  have 
indicated not  only  that the corporate sector  is in a financially vulnerable 26 
position, but that there has been a structural change in terms of debt usage. 
Financial ratios that  had previously been found useful in discriminant analysis 
were found to be no longer so, and the importance  of new ratios that reflect the 
ascendence  of  liquidity  and  short  term  debt  positions  over  solvency  and 
profitability was 
The results 
with the strength 
established. 
from the  simulations  afford  only one conclusion, if  a recession 
of either of the.contractions  that the economy has experienced 
since 1971 were to strike, the corporate industrial sector would be thf;own.  into 
an even more highly vulnerable financial position that would lead to a major 
rise in the incidence of bankruptcy.  These simulations  could only calculate the 
individual bankruptcies that would arise from each firm's internal financial 
problems, however, the  bankruptcy pattern is a dynamic, systemic one.  There are 
intra-firm linkages and  multiplier effects that this study fails to capture, yet 
it is understood that their inclusion  would serve to exacerbate these results. 
APPENDIX 
These discriminant functions were constructed by SAS for the PC, Version 
6.02.  The coefficients in the discriminant function are considered to be the 
maximum likelihood estimators and to  be asymptotically  efficient, as long as the 
sample is  multivariate normal [Judge,  Griffiths,  Hill, Lutkepohl and Lee, 19851. 
So, the results of this analysis are based on the sample  meeting the assumptions 
of normalcy:  variables with a multivariate normal distribution and covariance 
matrices  that  are  equal  [Eisenbeis, 19771.  In  discriminant  analysis  the 
classification procedure utilizes  these parameters when  it categorizes each 
observation, so the character of the distribution  may affect the results of the 
analysis. 27 
Both samples, the 1988 corporate structure and the discriminant  function, 
were tested for normality.  In both cases the distributions exhibited signs of 
kurtosis and skewness.  Given the non-normality of the samples in this study, 
a discriminant technique  was chosen that  would be the least susceptible to these 
biases.  Two  different  techniques were  initially  used.  The  hold-out  method 
produces consistent, unbiased estimates  with large samples, but they  may be less 
efficient than other methods.  The  U-method is supposed to  be more efficient than 
the hold-out method,  insensitive to sample size and insensitive to normality 
. 
assumptions [Altman,  Avery, Eisenbeis  and  Sinkey, 19811. Having these  qualities', 
it acts as a check on the hold-out method. 
As  the results from the two methods  in Table  2 show, on average their 
performance is quite similar.  At the margin the hold-out method out-performed 
the U-method, but  these marginally better results may be 
method's biases.  Overall the results would indicate that 
the hold-out method is large enough to produce consistent, 
due to the hold-out 
the sample size for 
unbiased estimates. 
Adding to the level of confidence that accompanies these results is the increase 
in the size of the sample that was used to construct the discriminant function 
that analyzed the 1988 sample and the simulations.  The number of variables 
remained constant and the number of observations doubled. 
A test of the equality of the  covariance  matrices found them to  be unequal, 
so a quadratic rather than a linear discriminant function was used.l'  The use 
of the quadratic function under these conditions produces better results than 
the linear function.  There is an increase in misclassification in the smaller 
group,  bankrupt, and a decrease in the larger  group, solvent, leaving 
overall misclassification rate only slightly changed  [Lachenbruch, 
and Revo, 19731. 
the  average 
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ENDNOTES 
1.  See the following for an overview of the domestic private  debt problem: 
Friedman  [1986a], Kaufman  [1986], Caskey  and  Fazzari  [1989],  Bernanke  and 
Campbell  [1988], Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen  [1988],  Wolfson  [1986] and the 
sustained  coverage  in various  issues  of  Business  and  the Wall  Street 
Journal. 
2.  The early work of Friedman  [1986b; 19851 and the contributions of Ciccolo 
and Baum [1985], Ciccolo [1987] and Taggart  [1985]  have researched the current 
trend toward rising debt usage by corporationsand  governments.  These empirical 
studies situate this current phenomenon onto an historical continuum.  In this 
context they argue that the current debt ratios are no higher than those of the 
pre-World War II era.  , 
3.  Several articles on the growing use of "junk bonds" for corporate finance 
have appeared in the press:  Rohatyn  [1989], New York Times, October 30, 1988 
and  Wall Street JournaL, March 15, 1988, October 25, 1988, November 25, 1988, 
December 5, 1988, January 3, 1989 and March 29, 1989. 
4.  David Ravenscraft and F.M. Scherer (19871 found that the expected increases 
in efficiency due  to increased merger  activity  that efficient market  theory 
predicted were not attained.  In fact, there was a decline in efficiency.  They 
also detected a negative impact on research and development expenditures.  Du 
Boff and Herman  [1989] found historical as well as current evidence to support 
their hypothesis that mergers produce not greater efficiency, but much greater 
fees for their promoters and financiers. 
5.  At the heart of market valuations of assets and debt is the assumptions on 
efficient markets.  Friedman [1988] prefers book valuation for debt due to its 
callability while others,  Wolfson (19861  andMitchell  [1983],  use the book value 
of  debt  (historical  cost)  because  it  reflects  the  actual  remaining  debt 
commitment on the part of the firm.  Bernanke and Campbell prefer the efficient 
market approach so that changes in market phenomena affect firms' valuations. 
Another  aspect of  their technique  is  the aggregation of  the  debt  and asset 
variables  across  all  firms  before  the  ratios  are  generated.  This  method 
implicitly gives greater weight to large firms in their analysis. 
6.  The method of discriminant analysis is not what is under discussion here, 
it is the appropriate use of the method.  The structural change that has ensued 
in the U.S. between 1968 and 1989 will be reflected in the changing financial 
structure, so that variables which were useful determinants in previous  time 
periods may not be in the current period.  Therefore, a discriminant function 
that discriminates well in 1968 is probably not able to do the same in 1989. 
Altman, Haldeman and  Narayanan [1977]  make this  point when they compare Altman's 
earlier Z-score model with the Zeta model. ? 
29 
7.  The Economic Renort of the President, 1988 records a decline in real GNP 
measured in 1982 dollars of -0.2% in 1980.  Survey of Current Business dates 
the recession in 1980 as beginning in January and ending in July. 
8.  Efficient market theory has been the basis for much of the recent work done 
in applied financial economics.  See  the following for an introduction:  Malkiel 
[1985; 19871 and Jensen  [1968]. 
9.  Schumpeter's concept of creative destruction views capital destruction as 
the first step in a two step process.  Recession induces bankruptcy which is the 
destruction of capital, but he sees new capital which  is more technologically 
advanced  replacing  the old,  obsolete capital while  the economy  is still  in 
recession.  This circumvents the production lag that Hudson foresees when the 
expansion begins. 
. 
10.  The bankruptcy categorization is defined for this study as having filed for 
bankruptcy with the court.  This implies that the court has jurisdiction over 
the firm and it may or may not continue to operate.  Compustat uses each firm's 
self-designated definition of its operating position. 
11.  While many of the studies on bankruptcy using discriminant analysis have 
found debt ratios to be instrumental in separating bankrupt  from non-bankrupt 
firms, the results have shown total debt rather than either long or short term 
debt to be the important variable [Beaver,1967;  Altman, 1968; Altman, Haldeman, 
and Narayanan, 1977; Deakin, 1977; and Elam, 19751. 
12.  As described in the Eco o ic Reoort of the President, 1988, the business  n m 
failure  rate  only  reaches  the  1%  bankruptcy  rate  in  1983.  In  the  years 
thereafter, 1984-1987, the rate remains at least equal to IS, but  the method 
changes, so  the data are not comparable to the pre-1984 period. 
13.  Morrison's  [1969] statistic for determining the probability of a correct 
classification is  based on population proportionality and actual classification 
or prior probabilities if they are used. 
(1)  P(Correct) - P(CorrectlClassified Type I)*P(Classified Type I) + 
P(CorrectlClassified Type II)*P(Classified Type II) 
or 
(1')  P(Correct) - pa + (1-p)*(l-a) 
where p is the true proportion of Type I individuals and a  is the proportion 
classified as Type I.  Equation (1)  or (1')  is the chance correct classification. 
The probability of correct classification for our two discriminant functions is 
50%:  P(Correct) - (0.01)*(0.5) + (0.99)*(0.5)  - 0.5. 
When  the  chance  correct  classification  is  SO%,  there  is  only  50% 
probability remaining before there would be 100% correct classification.  This 
discriminant function's overall rating of 69% means that 19% of the remaining 
50% has been correctly classified which is a 38% improvement over chance. 30 
14.  These  bankrupt  firms were  still  actively operating  after  having  filed 
bankruptcy petitions.  ‘l’he  bankrupt  firms  used  to construct the discriminant 
function were no longer in operation, so this difference adds another dimension 
to the bankrupt firms in the 1988 sample. 
15.  The values  of the financial ratios  that Bernanke and Campbell produced 
reflect variable  aggregation and  then  ratio construction.  The value  of each 
variable for all the companies was summed and then the ratios were constructed 
as  equation  (2)  indicates.  This  ratio  construction  technique  produces  a 
macroeconomy that is one big firm and it reduces the impact of small firms. 
Constructing the ratios at the level of the firm, aggregating and then 
averaging  them, produces a ratio  that reflects  the average  firm's  financial 
position  in the economy.  Equation  (3) reflects  this technique.  In such a 
construction small firms have equal weight with large firms and instead of one 
big firm, the emphasis is  on the average firm in the economy.  This  is  the method 
utilized in this study. 
(3)  CT-,,  (a/b), 
- a/b 
n 
16.  A  Baynesian  analysis  of  this  outcome  offers  a  different  view.  The 
probability of a solvent firm being chosen from the sample and classified as 
solvent is 0.99, while the probability of a bankrupt firm being chosen from the 
sample and classified‘as bankrupt is 0.03.  Using this approach the confidence 
in outcome would  be  in the solvent  classifications.  Irrespective  of which 
classification is  the  more statistically significant, the  adjustments can  be made 
to provide a view of expected bankruptcies in a recession. 
17.  Bernanke and Campbell explain this difference in the impacts of the two 
recession simulations on the debt-to-market value  equity ratio by noting  the 
reaction of the stock market in each recession.  In the 1973-74 recession the 
stock market maintained its value, so that increases in the value of debt would 
be monotonically  reflected in the debt-equity  ratio.  Contrarily,  the stock 
market  in  the  1980-82  recession  experienced  a major  loss  in value,  so  the 
increases in  debt  were partially offset by  the  decline inmarketvalue  of equity. 
Thus,  it was  the different stock market behavior, not behavior  towards debt 
usage, that produced the varied results in the two recessions and simulations. 
18.  Eisenbeis [1977]  cites Gilbert [1968]  and Marks and Dunn [1974] as the two 
studies  providing the rationale  behind the  use of the quadratic function.  These 
studies find that when  this assumption  is met,  then the linear discriminant 
function produces reduced results when compared to the results of a quadratic 
function.  Lachenbruch and  Goldstein [1979]  cite Clarke,  Lachenbruch and  Broffitt 
[1978]  who conclude that  a quadratic function  was not affected  by heavy kurtosis, 31 
actual error rates were larger than  optimal rates  and individual error rates  were 
affected more than average error rates.  Relating to unequal covariance matrices 
they found that the between-sample variability of the individual error rates 
irrespective of normalcy was large.  This accords with Marks and Dunn who found 
that with small sample sizes the quadratic function did poorly. 32 
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